Sunday, 25 March 2018

Too many eggs in the wrong basket


We know by now that leaving the EU means leaving its Customs Union. The Customs Union is an integral tenet of the Union’s treaties, and as such, simply falls away after the transition period comes to an end. For the UK, leaving it brings both opportunity and difficulty. Outside the (or a bespoke) Customs Union, we are able to regain much of the independence of our trade policy, but the necessity of customs posts dotted along the Irish border will be the price we pay.

Leave campaigners have consistently, and with some merit, pointed to a withdrawal from the Customs Union as being a sort of launching pad towards a new, UK push to champion global free trade. This, many argue, rests on the ability to reduce or ultimately abolish tariffs. The issue, though, is that by focusing purely on the gains to be made from tariff reduction we are setting ourselves up for underwhelming results. We are ignoring important points about protectionism and the nature of the Customs Union.

In the international trading system, any substantive efforts to promote free trade must focus on overcoming what are called non-tariff barriers. Typically NTBs come in the form of divergent regulations – different rules specifying the conditions for market access, and countries continue to struggle to find ways of agreeing on harmonised rules to facilitate trade. Without reaching common standards, trade will be either much more difficult or implausible altogether.

Most protectionism is now regulatory protectionism. Countries use rules and regulations to protect the integrity of their domestic markets, requiring of trading partners adoption of these rules. This development has emerged in response to plummeting tariffs, sparked largely by globalisation. More and more academic studies are pointing towards the effects of NTBs as representing far bigger costs to global trade than those added by tariffs.

Since the Customs Union only deals with tariff issues, as a protective device its use is inherently limited. The Customs Union does not give us common regulation and nor is it a device for rulemaking. Its only residual feature is the Common External Tariff (CET). But even here the extent to which the Customs Union is protectionist is somewhat exaggerated. The EU has implemented an intertwined mix of different initiatives designed to alleviate the tariff burden it imposes upon other countries.

The first of these initiatives is the Everything But Arms agreement (EBA), which provides 49 UN-classified Least Developed Countries (LDCs) with tariff-free access to the EU’s Internal Market. As the title suggests, this applies to any goods which aren’t arms or armaments. The second such initiative is a Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), or a GSP+ scheme, which provides low to middle income and vulnerable low to middle income countries with tariff free access across two thirds of product categories.

Arrangements like these offer what is effectively a waiver on the Customs Union. They say that for countries which are poorer and trying to develop, application of standard EU tariffs is unnecessarily punitive and stifles the promotion of economic growth and free trade. On Brexit, the UK will not be able to offer these countries preferential tariff regime, and the lesson here is that the scope of the Customs Union is far more restricted than is widely claimed.

Of course, the Customs Union is protectionist and demands that the needs of many European producers are prioritised over the needs of consumers. I broadly agree that tariff reduction is a positive thing, but at the same time I don’t subscribe to the notion that the way to go is total unilateral disarmament. In dropping our tariff walls to zero post-Brexit we would leave ourselves with much less in the way of negotiating leverage.

The UK will find benefit in leaving the Customs Union, but it is important not to wildly inflate our expectations of what is to come. Tariff differentials create border friction, along with the Rules of Origin hurdle which will be reintroduced when exporting to the EU as a result of leaving the Customs Union. Without the or a comprehensive customs union, the Irish border will not be completely frictionless, though technological devices can help to alleviate some of the pressure.

I don't want the UK in any sort of post-Brexit customs union with anybody. But I acknowledge that this cannot be squared with frictionless trade on the Irish border. Really it is a question of weighing up the benefits of such an arrangement with the drawbacks. The Customs Union does create barriers to trade but it is important that we identify where these are. I think a little calm on the question of post-Brexit trade policy is in order if we are to discuss the merits of leaving the Customs Union constructively.

Saturday, 3 March 2018

A looming deadline


Last summer I made quite a fuss about two important provisions within the confines of the EEA Agreement. They are Articles 126 and 127, which deal with withdrawal and the scope of the Treaty's application. Some of my more long-term readers will remember work I have written on the legal withdrawal from the EEA, such as here. My position, in summary, was that in order to formally initiate its departure from the Single Market, the UK Government would have to invoke Article 127. And that not doing so would see us enter a period of legal haziness.

Article 127 of the Agreement states: "Each Contracting Party may withdraw from this Agreement provided it gives at least twelve months' notice in writing to the other Contracting Parties. Immediately after the notification of the intended withdrawal, the other Contracting Parties shall convene a diplomatic conference in order to envisage the necessary modifications to bring to the Agreement." This twelve month period extends to March 29th 2018, a date which sits but a few weeks away. The deadline for invoking this Article is closing in.

Quite what happens if the government does not pull this lever I do not know. Frustratingly, legal opinion is heavily divided on the issue and far be it from me to masquerade as some kind of QC or expert on international law. I try as hard as possible to base my views on the available evidence and will reference those with the expertise as I go. I have found use in following the arguments of the Single Market Justice campaign (led by Peter Wilding and Adrian Yalland), this paper produced by the Institute for Government and this EEA Briefing Paper, which notes:

"The United Kingdom is a separate “Contracting Party” to the EEA Agreement in its own right: so it is bound, in its own right, by the EEA Agreement. It owes obligations under the EEA Agreement to States that are not members of the EU (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), and since it is a basic principle of international law that States are not affected by Treaties to which they are not party, it is impossible to see how the rights of those States (and the rights of their citizens) could be affected by action under the EU Treaties. 
Some commentators have pointed to the fact that Article 126(1) refers to the territory covered by the EEA Agreement as being the “territories” to which the EU Treaties apply (in addition to Norway, 3 Iceland and Liechtenstein). Indeed, this was the Government’s initial position prior to the commencement of the EEA Judicial Review. 
However, the Government then abandoned this position and finally accepted that Article 126 did not “give rise to termination of the EEA Agreement ipso jure”. In fact, if the intent of Article 126 were to limit the Agreement only to states which are at any time member states of the EU (and Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), the use of the word “territories” would then be incongruous. 
It is made clear by Article 126(2) that “territories” refers to territories which are not included within the Contracting Parties’ national borders, but for which the Contracting Parties have diplomatic responsibility. Article 126(2) then disapplies the Agreement from some of those territories."

Readers should remember that the European Economic Area is a separate legal entity from the European Union. The EU makes up a large part of that area, with three Efta states (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) making up the other part. A portion of the EU's acquis is transposed into the EEA Acquis, where fisheries and agriculture are notably excluded and the residuals in the framework relate only to trade. The EEA becomes effectively an extension of much of the EU's internal market, so we are left really with two Single Markets, almost totally identical, sitting side by side.

The 2015 Referendum Act did not cover membership of the EEA. And, as per standard UK constitutional requirements, new parliamentary legislation is the only mechanism through which a change in international law can have any domestic effect. Unlike most countries on the continent, we are a dualist state and, since Brexit is rooted largely in a clamouring for parliamentary sovereignty, it seems fitting to honour the process with a little consistency and take the appropriate legal and parliamentary route towards whichever destination this government is steering us.

I notice also that my friend Jonathan Lis has written a useful article on the issue just recently. I was happy to see this because I had completely forgotten about its importance in debate. So much concentration has been placed upon Article 50 (of a separate and legally distinct Treaty) and phase two and transition periods that the EEA elephant in the room has been left marginalised so to speak. This oughtn't continue. We aren't appreciating the enormity of the legal uncertainty which could lie ahead. I am talking the UK operating as a third country (to the EU) and EEA signatory simultaneously. Politically these positions stand in direct contradiction to each other.

Even if legally it is decided A127 invocation isn't necessary, we should still opt to do so for the sake of clarity. Most Efta officials believe that formal notification of withdrawal is congruent with the scope of the agreement. So too do a large number of barristers. The weight of this opinion renders mine valueless but I will make my points regardless. My agenda here is clearly political. Nonetheless a good way to build on the Prime Minister's pragmatic speech this week would be to take our loose ends seriously and tie them up wherever possible.

Thursday, 1 March 2018

A further complication


I am coming to the end of my body of work on the EU's Customs Union, and on customs unions in general. Most of the content here can now simply be re-plugged, rather than added to, and I thank readers who spend their time sharing it. I mentioned in my post on Tuesday that there were a couple of little residual issues left to write about for the sake of informing those invested in these issues. One of them is the relationship between services and customs unions, tackled here, and the other is the variety of exemptions from the Customs Union afforded to poorer, developing countries.

In truth I should have grappled with this stuff before the referendum but it wouldn't have made much difference. The level of knowledge of the features of customs unions in the Commons is so dire and I have no real way of influencing public policy. All I can hope to do is inform the informers, which I rather think must continue with broad clarification on the relationship between trade in services and customs unions. This issue has been left uncharted thanks to stoic agreement that tariffs do not apply to services, but there are important exceptions to this rule that are worthy of discussion.

Thankfully, grasping a broad outline of services trade is not especially difficult. The WTO's General Agreement on Trade and Services (Article 1.2) outlines four international modes of service. Mode 1 is cross-border, where a customer in country B receives a service from country A by means of post or telecommunications. Think architectural drawings or medical advice. Mode 2 is where consumption takes place abroad, for instance in the case of a patient travelling to another country in order to benefit from some kind of medical service.

Mode 3 services are transmitted by commercial presence abroad, where a company based in country A sets up a subsidiary in country B and offers services from that sister outlet (such as EasyJet in Vienna). Mode 4 services involve the movement and enterprise of persons. An individual, such as a caseworker or consultant, moves to a different country and provides services in the new country. An argument can therefore easily run that since services do not relate in any way to customs duties, they are not affected by a (or the) customs union.

Except this is not technically accurate. And to understand why we need to delve into changes to manufacturing techniques and examine the role of service inputs in goods, or 'services in a box'. This we have come to term Mode 5 services, which have fallen completely under the radar of trade discourse and the WTO's website. This is perhaps useful as the simplicities of the Customs Union have themselves been difficult enough to grasp for the relevant politicians. Further complication of discourse is arguably ill-advised for those who do not consider themselves Brexit or trade obsessives.

Mode 5 services are goods to which a service (or more) has contributed or accompanies. An example of a Mode 5 service might be a software package embedded within a bundle of IT hardware or design engineering accompanying an automotive part. They are services which are inseparable from and embedded within goods, which then rely on GATT for general trading guidelines, meaning that they count as goods and that they may be subject to duties. This means that if the value-added service element appears within a product which qualifies for a duty, we know we have a Mode 5 service.

For manufacturers the external sourcing of service content, whether domestic or international, represents an increasingly quantitatively significant part of production. We refer to this trend as the 'servicification' of manufacturing and Mode 5 services exports now form around 35% of the EU27's merchandise exports, according to 2009 TiVA statistics. This is a mathematically important chunk.  Typically, merchandise exports will mean retail goods, as they are unnatural products which are produced in response to consumer preference and market demand.

So services relate to the or a customs union in so far as a service element is added to a good which must filter through some kind of duty. Inside the EU, UK exporters exporting to Europe are not presented with any additional hurdles. The very fact of the CET being wrapped around EU members and (theoretically) eliminating the possibility of circumvention means that preferential treatment is assumed. A good will either originate from within the EU or it will have been fed through the CET. Tackling tariff differentials becomes a problem for customs officials at the EU's external frontier.

In leaving the EU's Customs Union and not establishing a bespoke alternative, Mode 5 services are likely to face documentary hurdles since they will simply be treated as goods. This could mean they qualify merely for MFN tariffs or FTA-negotiated tariffs depending upon the nature of the future relationship. Customs officials will simply treat them as they would other physical goods. Their job is to assess whether the relevant VAT and tariff has been paid and translate any transactions to HMRC upon scanning paperwork. The fact of an internal service element existing will mean nothing.

What makes this interesting is that often Mode 5 services add substantially to the value of a product. We might be looking at research and development or we might be looking at some form of marketing consultancy. All indicators point towards Mode 5 services gaining traction as an influential aspect to modern trade and this may be an area where tariffs have a more discernible impact. And beyond tariff rates, a post-customs union UK will need to accompany Mode 5 service goods with certificates of origin in order to prove qualification for preferential treatment.

Another important point here is that plain to see are failings at the WTO. Exporters are in urgent need of a global redefining of trading rules to accommodate significant changes to the ways in which services are actually administered. Effectively trading actors have jumped ahead of the rules and find themselves in need of guidance. The omission of Mode 5 services in both GATS and GATT reflects how far multilateral trade negotiations have actually fallen behind developments in manufacturing and globalisation. Global talks are long and arduous, technological change is often very rapid.

The end result is that we have yet another sizeable gap in Britain's understanding of trade. Just as it embarks upon the greatest shift in trade policy in living memory.